Bailouts × Banks × Fed × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Treasury × Volatility
Fed × Fed Fund Target Rate × US Dollar × Volatility
Fed Fund Target Rate 1 year
Fed Fund Target Rate 5 months
Source: St. Louis Fed
AIG × Bailouts × Banks × Ben Bernanke × CNBC × Commodities × Credits × Fed × FRE × Geo Politics × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US House of Representatives × US Politics × US Treasury
AIG × Alan Greenspan × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US House of Representatives × US Politics × US Treasury × US$ Index
Bail Outs × Bailouts × Banks × US Dollar × US Economy × US House of Representatives × US Politics × US Treasury
Bailouts × Banks × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Politics × US Treasury
Fed × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Politics × US Treasury × US$ Index
Bail Outs × Peter Schiff × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Politics × US Treasury × US$ Index
Bernie Sanders × CNBC × Kudlow
Bail Outs × Bailouts × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Politics × US Treasury
To the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate:
As economists, we want to express to Congress our great concern for the plan proposed by Treasury Secretary Paulson to deal with the financial crisis. We are well aware of the difficulty of the current financial situation and we agree with the need for bold action to ensure that the financial system continues to function. We see three fatal pitfalls in the currently proposed plan:
1) Its fairness. The plan is a subsidy to investors at taxpayers’ expense. Investors who took risks to earn profits must also bear the losses. Not every business failure carries systemic risk. The government can ensure a well-functioning financial industry, able to make new loans to creditworthy borrowers, without bailing out particular investors and institutions whose choices proved unwise.
2) Its ambiguity. Neither the mission of the new agency nor its oversight are clear. If taxpayers are to buy illiquid and opaque assets from troubled sellers, the terms, occasions, and methods of such purchases must be crystal clear ahead of time and carefully monitored afterwards.
3) Its long-term effects. If the plan is enacted, its effects will be with us for a generation. For all their recent troubles, America's dynamic and innovative private capital markets have brought the nation unparalleled prosperity. Fundamentally weakening those markets in order to calm short-run disruptions is desperately short-sighted.
For these reasons we ask Congress not to rush, to hold appropriate hearings, and to carefully consider the right course of action, and to wisely determine the future of the financial industry and the U.S. economy for years to come.
Signed (updated at 9/25/2008 8:30AM CT)
Acemoglu Daron (Massachussets Institute of Technology)
Adler Michael (Columbia University)
Admati Anat R. (Stanford University)
Alexis Marcus (Northwestern University)
Alvarez Fernando (University of Chicago)
Andersen Torben (Northwestern University)
Baliga Sandeep (Northwestern University)
Banerjee Abhijit V. (Massachussets Institute of Technology)
Barankay Iwan (University of Pennsylvania)
Barry Brian (University of Chicago)
Bartkus James R. (Xavier University of Louisiana)
Becker Charles M. (Duke University)
Becker Robert A. (Indiana University)
Beim David (Columbia University)
Berk Jonathan (Stanford University)
Bisin Alberto (New York University)
Bittlingmayer George (University of Kansas)
Boldrin Michele (Washington University)
Brooks Taggert J. (University of Wisconsin)
Brynjolfsson Erik (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Buera Francisco J. (UCLA)
Camp Mary Elizabeth (Indiana University)
Carmel Jonathan (University of Michigan)
Carroll Christopher (Johns Hopkins University)
Cassar Gavin (University of Pennsylvania)
Chaney Thomas (University of Chicago)
Chari Varadarajan V. (University of Minnesota)
Chauvin Keith W. (University of Kansas)
Chintagunta Pradeep K. (University of Chicago)
Christiano Lawrence J. (Northwestern University)
Cochrane John (University of Chicago)
Coleman John (Duke University)
Constantinides George M. (University of Chicago)
Crain Robert (UC Berkeley)
Culp Christopher (University of Chicago)
Da Zhi (University of Notre Dame)
Davis Morris (University of Wisconsin)
De Marzo Peter (Stanford University)
Dubé Jean-Pierre H. (University of Chicago)
Edlin Aaron (UC Berkeley)
Eichenbaum Martin (Northwestern University)
Ely Jeffrey (Northwestern University)
Eraslan Hülya K. K.(Johns Hopkins University)
Faulhaber Gerald (University of Pennsylvania)
Feldmann Sven (University of Melbourne)
Fernandez-Villaverde Jesus (University of Pennsylvania)
Fohlin Caroline (Johns Hopkins University)
Fox Jeremy T. (University of Chicago)
Frank Murray Z.(University of Minnesota)
Frenzen Jonathan (University of Chicago)
Fuchs William (University of Chicago)
Fudenberg Drew (Harvard University)
Gabaix Xavier (New York University)
Gao Paul (Notre Dame University)
Garicano Luis (University of Chicago)
Gerakos Joseph J. (University of Chicago)
Gibbs Michael (University of Chicago)
Glomm Gerhard (Indiana University)
Goettler Ron (University of Chicago)
Goldin Claudia (Harvard University)
Gordon Robert J. (Northwestern University)
Greenstone Michael (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Guadalupe Maria (Columbia University)
Guerrieri Veronica (University of Chicago)
Hagerty Kathleen (Northwestern University)
Hamada Robert S. (University of Chicago)
Hansen Lars (University of Chicago)
Harris Milton (University of Chicago)
Hart Oliver (Harvard University)
Hazlett Thomas W. (George Mason University)
Heaton John (University of Chicago)
Heckman James (University of Chicago - Nobel Laureate)
Henderson David R. (Hoover Institution)
Henisz, Witold (University of Pennsylvania)
Hertzberg Andrew (Columbia University)
Hite Gailen (Columbia University)
Hitsch Günter J. (University of Chicago)
Hodrick Robert J. (Columbia University)
Hopenhayn Hugo (UCLA)
Hurst Erik (University of Chicago)
Imrohoroglu Ayse (University of Southern California)
Isakson Hans (University of Northern Iowa)
Israel Ronen (London Business School)
Jaffee Dwight M. (UC Berkeley)
Jagannathan Ravi (Northwestern University)
Jenter Dirk (Stanford University)
Jones Charles M. (Columbia Business School)
Kaboski Joseph P. (Ohio State University)
Kahn Matthew (UCLA)
Kaplan Ethan (Stockholm University)
Karolyi, Andrew (Ohio State University)
Kashyap Anil (University of Chicago)
Keim Donald B (University of Pennsylvania)
Ketkar Suhas L (Vanderbilt University)
Kiesling Lynne (Northwestern University)
Klenow Pete (Stanford University)
Koch Paul (University of Kansas)
Kocherlakota Narayana (University of Minnesota)
Koijen Ralph S.J. (University of Chicago)
Kondo Jiro (Northwestern University)
Korteweg Arthur (Stanford University)
Kortum Samuel (University of Chicago)
Krueger Dirk (University of Pennsylvania)
Ledesma Patricia (Northwestern University)
Lee Lung-fei (Ohio State University)
Leeper Eric M. (Indiana University)
Leuz Christian (University of Chicago)
Levine David I.(UC Berkeley)
Levine David K.(Washington University)
Levy David M. (George Mason University)
Linnainmaa Juhani (University of Chicago)
Lott John R. Jr. (University of Maryland)
Lucas Robert (University of Chicago - Nobel Laureate)
Luttmer Erzo G.J. (University of Minnesota)
Manski Charles F. (Northwestern University)
Martin Ian (Stanford University)
Mayer Christopher (Columbia University)
Mazzeo Michael (Northwestern University)
McDonald Robert (Northwestern University)
Meadow Scott F. (University of Chicago)
Mehra Rajnish (UC Santa Barbara)
Mian Atif (University of Chicago)
Middlebrook Art (University of Chicago)
Miguel Edward (UC Berkeley)
Miravete Eugenio J. (University of Texas at Austin)
Miron Jeffrey (Harvard University)
Moretti Enrico (UC Berkeley)
Moriguchi Chiaki (Northwestern University)
Moro Andrea (Vanderbilt University)
Morse Adair (University of Chicago)
Mortensen Dale T. (Northwestern University)
Mortimer Julie Holland (Harvard University)
Muralidharan Karthik (UC San Diego)
Nanda Dhananjay (University of Miami)
Nevo Aviv (Northwestern University)
Ohanian Lee (UCLA)
Pagliari Joseph (University of Chicago)
Papanikolaou Dimitris (Northwestern University)
Parker Jonathan (Northwestern University)
Paul Evans (Ohio State University)
Pejovich Svetozar (Steve) (Texas A&M University)
Peltzman Sam (University of Chicago)
Perri Fabrizio (University of Minnesota)
Phelan Christopher (University of Minnesota)
Piazzesi Monika (Stanford University)
Piskorski Tomasz (Columbia University)
Rampini Adriano (Duke University)
Reagan Patricia (Ohio State University)
Reich Michael (UC Berkeley)
Reuben Ernesto (Northwestern University)
Roberts Michael (University of Pennsylvania)
Robinson David (Duke University)
Rogers Michele (Northwestern University)
Rotella Elyce (Indiana University)
Ruud Paul (Vassar College)
Safford Sean (University of Chicago)
Sandbu Martin E. (University of Pennsylvania)
Sapienza Paola (Northwestern University)
Savor Pavel (University of Pennsylvania)
Scharfstein David (Harvard University)
Seim Katja (University of Pennsylvania)
Seru Amit (University of Chicago)
Shang-Jin Wei (Columbia University)
Shimer Robert (University of Chicago)
Shore Stephen H. (Johns Hopkins University)
Siegel Ron (Northwestern University)
Smith David C. (University of Virginia)
Smith Vernon L.(Chapman University- Nobel Laureate)
Sorensen Morten (Columbia University)
Spiegel Matthew (Yale University)
Stevenson Betsey (University of Pennsylvania)
Stokey Nancy (University of Chicago)
Strahan Philip (Boston College)
Strebulaev Ilya (Stanford University)
Sufi Amir (University of Chicago)
Tabarrok Alex (George Mason University)
Taylor Alan M. (UC Davis)
Thompson Tim (Northwestern University)
Tschoegl Adrian E. (University of Pennsylvania)
Uhlig Harald (University of Chicago)
Ulrich, Maxim (Columbia University)
Van Buskirk Andrew (University of Chicago)
Veronesi Pietro (University of Chicago)
Vissing-Jorgensen Annette (Northwestern University)
Wacziarg Romain (UCLA)
Weill Pierre-Olivier (UCLA)
Williamson Samuel H. (Miami University)
Witte Mark (Northwestern University)
Wolfers Justin (University of Pennsylvania)
Woutersen Tiemen (Johns Hopkins University)
Zingales Luigi (University of Chicago)
Zitzewitz Eric (Dartmouth College)
Source:
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/john.cochrane/research/Papers/mortgage_protest.htm
Other links,
http://www.zogby.com/Soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=18369
http://news.yahoo.com/s/politico/20080921/pl_politico/13689
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/a-700-billion-slap-in-the-face/#more-906
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/24/AR2008092402799.html?nav=hcmodule
http://georgewashington2.blogspot.com/2008/09/prestigious-group-of-economists-slam.html
Milton Friedman × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Politics × US Treasury
Box#1 is a clear winner, because you have 100% Freedom of Choice.
Box#4 is a clear loser, because you have 0% Freedom of Choice.
Now, let's take current example of Fed & U.S. Treasury about to spend more than 1,000,000,000,000 (One Trillion) of US tax payers money to bail out big banks & other financials on Wall Street. Sounds familiar???? Box#4.....
God Bless America....
Milton Friedman × US Economy × US Politics
First United States had "Free Market Capitalism".... Then there was an era of "Regulated Market Capitalism" after birth of Federal Reserve.....Now, we have a whole new thing called"Socialism Market Capitalism"..... Socialism for rich..........
What would be the after effects of this Socialism in the country according to Milton Friedman?
Bail Outs × Bailouts × Bill Moyers × Kevin Phillips × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Politics
- Financialization
- Huge built up of U.S. debt
- Home prices collapsing
- Global Commodity inflation building up
- Fraud Government Statistics
- Peak Oil-Shortage of Oil
- Collapsing Dollar
Banks × Ben Bernanke × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Treasury × US$ Index
Conventional wisdom has it that, as a government fiscalises the contingent liabilities of nationalised banks, the currency of the country in question should depreciate. More generally, banking crises are, very often, accompanied by balance of payments (or currency) crises. The
Popular Thesis on Nationalisation and the Dollar
The notion that nationalisation of banks should lead to currency weakness is popular mainly because it is intuitive. Since nationalisation of banks is ‘not good news’, and runs counter to the principles of capitalism and the free market, some have the visceral reaction to sell the currency in question.
Further, as highlighted by Kaminsky and Reinhart (K&R) (see Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart (1999), “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems”, The American Economic Review 89: 3, June), there are many historical examples of ‘twin crises’, whereby banking crises and currency crises occurred simultaneously. The more memorable examples include
This link between banking crises and currency crises is genuine, and the usual dynamics are well-summarised by ex-Governor of the Riksbank (
Moreover, nationalisation of banks will increase the fiscal burden of the government. For a country that already has a large fiscal deficit, this is clearly negative for the interest rate outlook. For one that also has an external deficit, a large public borrowing need, ceteris paribus, should translate into a weaker currency, so the logic goes. At the same time, the central bank may be tempted to ‘monetise’ the debt, or run a monetary stance that is easier than otherwise – again currency-negative.
The Inconvenient Historical Fact
While the arguments above may sound logical and compelling to many, the inconvenient fact is that the historical pattern of how currencies perform before and after nationalisation or bail-outs tells a very different story. Averaged across five episodes of prominent banking crises, the nominal exchange rate tended to fall before nationalisation, but rise thereafter.
The historical pattern suggests that financial markets tend to be forward-looking and try to price in the deterioration in the state of the banking system by selling down the currency and financial sector stocks, but the government is usually not compelled to act until conditions deteriorate significantly. As a result, more often than not, government interventions have coincided with the lows in currency values. In other words, even though K&R’s observation that currency crises often occur simultaneously with banking crises is correct, there is no strong proof that nationalisation leads to further currency weakness.
Other more visible examples are consistent with this link between banking crises and currency crises. The S&L Crisis and its bail-out spanned a protracted period of time. The dollar index did continue to fall from 1986 – the beginning of the S&L Crisis – until 1989 or so. (In 1986, the FSLIC (Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) – the deposit insurance scheme funded by the thrift industry but guaranteed by the government – first reported being insolvent (incidentally, the main reason why 1986 is remembered as the beginning of the S&L Crisis). The RTC (Resolution Trust Corporation) was established in 1989, and by 2003, the RTC had ‘resolved’ US$394 billion worth of non-performing assets of US savings and loans. (The total cost of the clean-up of the US S&L Crisis reached US$153 billion, in ‘current’ terms equivalent to some 2.6% of US GDP in 1991. This translates to US$375 billion in 2008 dollar terms.) The dollar index essentially moved sideways in the early 1990s. The dollar did falter in 1994/95, but that was attributed more to the inflation scare than to the S&L Crisis. Similarly,
The case of the
In sum, banking crises are unambiguously bad for currencies, but nationalisation per se does not make the situation worse for currencies. In fact, it often marks the low in the currencies.
The
Having said the above, the
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its budget update last week, and predicted that the
Investors will likely see it as key for the next Administration to control spending. However, it is also important for investors to appreciate how sensitive
Bottom Line
Banking crises are bad for currencies, but nationalisation per se does not necessarily make it worse for currencies. In fact, it often marks the low in the currencies. We believe this is the case for the dollar in the current episode. What remains a lingering risk for the dollar over the medium term is the
http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2008/20080919-Fri.html#anchor6931
Commodities × Crude Oil × Currencies × Gold × SPX
Bail Outs × Bailouts × Banks × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Treasury
US Economy × US Financials
Finally WSJ admits that these crisis are worst since Great Depression. I wonder when McCain & Obama will admit that. They both have same policies & they are called "SPENDINGS, BUT NO SAVINGS." Funnily enough current president of United States is saying that "WE ARE JUST HAVING SMALL CORRECTION."
Bail Outs × Bailouts × Banks × FNM × FRE × US Dollar × US Economy × US Financials × US Treasury
AUD/USD × AUDUSD × EUR/USD × Euro × Gold × USD/CHF × USD/JPY
Following charts are Gold against EUR, Gold/AUD, Gold/JPY
Cognitrend Model × EUR/GBP × EUR/JPY × GBP/USD × USD/JPY
Sources:
Cognitrend
DB-Markets
Gold × Paul Van Eden
Rest of the article.....
EUR/USD × Fed × Gold × SPX × USD/CHF × USD/JPY
Crude oil is down & there is temporary enough liquidity in market. Fed & other central banks are really committed to continue their Term Auction Facility program to pump up money. So, I am not seeing any other reasons right now for SPX, not to go back 1300 in coming months.
That means, USD/JPY back to previous key level of 108-109.
EUR/USD should remain in pressure due to ECB's dovishness towards interest rate. Check previous post on currency analysis for detail fundamental view.
I'll be watching Gold really carefully becase in India key festival season (Diwali) of the year is coming next month. India is the largest consumer of Gold. If consumer demand increases for gold for the season more than expected than surely there'll temporary rise on AUD & EUR, but rise would be really limited.
So, let's keep watching volume & open interest and make some money.
Happy trading.
Banks × Ben Bernanke × Fed × FOMC × US Dollar
AIG × Bailouts × CDO × CDS × US Treasury
Bail Outs × Banks × msc × Nouriel Roubini
Bail Outs × Banks × US Economy
Bail Outs × Banks × US Dollar × US Economy × USDJPY
Crude Oil × Euro × Geo Politics × US Economy
Euro × Trading Economics × US Dollar × US Economy
The end result of the global economic slowdown may be the U.S. announcing national bankruptcy as the government cannot afford the bailouts that it promised and the market will not bail out the government, Martin Hennecke, senior manager of private clients at Tyche, told CNBC on Thursday.
"We expect a depression in the United States. We expect a depression, very possibly, also in Europe," Hennecke said on "Worldwide Exchange."
EUR/USD × GBP/USD × US Dollar × US Economy × USD/CHF × USD/JPY × USDCAD
Foreign Banks(ECB, RBA, RBNZ, BOC, BOE) were raising Interest Rates because of their Inflation Focused policies.
Inflation - Higher Crude Oil price were leading to higher prices of goods & slowing spending.
Foreign Banks were not lowering Interest Rates because they were not hit that much on Banking/Credit crisis compare to United States. Instead lowering rates, they started lending money through Term Auction Facilities to various Banks.
Due to declining growth in United States, high crude oil price & credit problems, Japan/Asia was having less exports to US which made JPY to rise & carry trades started declining since then.
So, that is why due to Higher Interest Rates in G7 nations & rise in commodities AUD, NZ, EUR were gaining while at same time due to credit problems in USD/ JPY was also gaining. Correlation Coefficient between JPY and other majors at that time was high.
*************************************************************************************
Swissie has largest exports-imports to EU nations compare to other G7 countries like US, AUD, JPY, so naturally Swissie would follow direction of EURO. US Dollar/Swiss Franc & Euro/US Dollar has >0.95 correlation coefficient.
Britain also got into trouble of Inflation & Credit Crunch immidiately after US sneezzed. Bank of England started lowering interest rate from end of 2007. GBP/USD had high correlation with EUR/USD, AUD/USD, USD/JPY, USD/CHF until end of November 2007. But since BOE officials started talking about lowering interest rates GBP lost correlation since then with other majors.
Canadian Dollar made highest high against US Dollar in first week of November '07. BOC started lowering interst rate from first week of December '07. Since Canadians & Americans both were lowering rates at same time, USD/CAD remained sideways for long time until first week of August '08. US & Canada are biggest exporter/importer to each other.
Australian Dollar started falling big time from end of July '08. Australia is one of the largest exporter of metals to world. As we noticed Gold had failed to make new high in that month. Also, crude oil started declining after $146 high due to big time slow down (less demand) in United States & Britain. Land of Aussies also had somewhat effect on US/Britain Credit Crunch. Less demand of commodities & metals made Aussie Dollar drop big time. Low prices of commodities help somewhat RBA to fight inflation. But due to credit worries AUS was also forced to join Kiwis, Canadians, Americans & Britishers.
EUR/USD exchage rate decline was mainly by two factors: drop in commodities & slowing down in German Businesses. Euro holds 57.6% of US Dollar Index & we know that Gold and US Dollar has inverse connection. So, naturally Euro has to fall with falling price of Gold. Germany factory orders has declined big time since April of this year which also contributed falling price of EURO big time. ECB is still fighting with Credit Crunch & bank problems which started in United States. Trichet in last meeting already mentioned that ECB is not planning to raise interest rate in this year. Therefore traders started betting towards short side of EUR/USD.
*************************************************************************************
So now what in last quater of 2008 & 2009?
ECB will have to lower interest rate sooner in next meeting or meeting after due to demand of credit expansion in Euro Zone. Banks are still in trouble in United States & having their global effect. Slowing down in consumer spending & businesses in Germany & other EU Nations will make ECB to lower interest rate soon. Right now, EUR/USD is being traded near 1.39. And since we are expecting lowering rate from ECB soon, next stop for EUR/USD are 1.35 & 1.32.
Swissie will follow direction of EUR & Gold since it also has safe haven status due to SNB's gold reserve.
Aussie will depend on rise & fall on prices of commodities. Since ECB will lower interest rate next, Gold & Silver will fall further & it'll make AUD more weaker. On weekly chart, AUD hasn't made lower high yet, but 7% interest rate from 7.25% has already lowered demand of AUD a bit. AUD may fall further if credit expansion demand increases & retail sales, factory orders of metals/commodities declines. Recently RBNZ has lowered interest rate to 7.50% from 8.00% which gives us higher probability that RBA will also soon lower rate speaking from AUD-NZD correlation ratio.
We don't know how many more write downs are coming. And I am already bearish on SPX & Nikkei (less demand of Japanese goods due slow down in United States) which will make JPY only stronger. JPY will test previous lows against USD if it fails to hold current daily time frame channle.
GBP can go only one way due to Banking problems & slowing down in British Pound. It may rise against EUR once ECB reduces interest rate. GBP ain't world's reserve currency, so hypothesis like The Dollar Smile cannot be applied on Cable.
Swissie will follow direction of EUR & Gold since it also has safe haven status due to SNB's gold reserve.
Canadian Dollar is also solid on selling side because of it's heavy exports of commodity products to United States.
I am not expecting for Fed to raise interest rate until banks hit the bottom. So far there are no signs of Financials in United States hitting bottom, not till 2009. But US Dollar will continue strenghning, not because US has solid economy, but rest of world is slowing down.
Note:
- Correlation Coefficient ratio of JPY with EUR, AUD & SWISSIE & GOLD, Oil is <>
- JPY still has strong correlation coefficient ratio with Nikkie, SPX, VIX & TNX.
- GBP & CAD are now somewhat back with a bit strong correlation ration with EUR, SWISSIE & AUD.
- Situation will be different if ECB doesn't lower the rate as expected & some unexpected Geopolitics plays a big role in Crude Oil.
US Dollar × US Economy × US$ Index
On this theory, if the US economy goes into a severe decline, or hard landing, then the dollar should rise. The rest of the world suffers, and the dollar is a relative safe haven.
If the US economy goes on a growth spurt, outpacing the rest of the world, the dollar gains.
But between these two outcomes lies a “soft landing”, where the US economy muddles through. If this happens, the dollar gets pummelled. Other countries have higher interest rates, and there is nothing to defend the dollar."
Source:Read more on Financial Times
Who is Stephen Jen?